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ABSRACT 
This presentation documents Kennedy Space 
Center’s Independent Assessment work completed on 
three assessments for the Ground Systems 
Development and Operations (GSDO) Program to 
assist the Chief Safety and Mission Assurance 
Officer during key programmatic reviews and 
provided the GSDO Program with analyses of how 
egress time affects the likelihood of astronaut and 
ground worker survival during an emergency. 
For each assessment, a team developed probability 
distributions for hazard scenarios to address 
statistical uncertainty, resulting in survivability plots 
over time. The first assessment developed a 
mathematical model of probabilistic survivability 
versus time to reach a safe location using an ideal 
Emergency Egress System at Launch Complex 39B 
(LC-39B); the second used the first model to evaluate 
and compare various egress systems under 
consideration at LC-39B.  The third used a modified 
LC-39B model to determine if a specific hazard 
decreased survivability more rapidly than other 
events during flight hardware processing in 
Kennedy’s Vehicle Assembly Building. 
 
SUMMARY 
Based on the composite survivability versus time 
graphs from the first two assessments, there was a 
soft “knee” in the Figure of Merit graphs at eight 
minutes (ten minutes after egress ordered). Thus, the 
graphs illustrated to the decision makers that the final 
emergency egress design selected should have the 
capability of transporting the flight crew from the top 
of LC 39B to a safe location in eight minutes or less.  
Results for the third assessment were dominated by 
hazards that were classified as instantaneous in nature 
(e.g. stacking mishaps) and therefore had no effect on 
survivability vs time to egress the Vehicle Assembly 
Building (VAB). VAB emergency scenarios that 
degraded over time (e.g. fire) produced survivability 
vs time graphs that were line with aerospace industry 
norms. 
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http://hdl.handle.net/2060/20150021266. 
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3KSC INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT
WHO ARE WE? WHAT DO WE DO?
KSC Independent Assessment (IA)
 Capability funded by the Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance fro the NASA Human Spaceflight Centers.
 Allows Human Spaceflight Centers to independently review 
and assess technical and mission risks associated with 
Program and Projects.
 Provides objective, non-advocating analysis and solutions.
Assessments triggered by multiple Customers
 KSC Center Director
 KSC SMA Director
 Program/Project Managers/Chief SMA Officers
 KSC Directors
Wide variety of subjects
 Systemic processes (e.g. Mission Assurance)
 Institutional (e.g. Personnel Safety)
 Technical (e.g. LC 39B Emergency Egress Assessment)
Modernizing KSC’s spaceport with capabilities to 
launch the Orion Crew Module and Space Launch 
System (SLS).
 Orion Crew Module will taking humans to multiple deep 
space destinations extending beyond our Moon, to 
Mars, and across our solar system.
 SLS will carry the Orion Crew Module, as well as cargo, 
equipment and scientific payloads into deep space.
The SLS will be launched from Launch Complex 39B 
(LC 39B) at KSC.  SLS will be comprised of 
approximately:
 2,772,100 pounds of solid propellant.
 527,400 gallons of Liquid Hydrogen.
 197,000 gallons of Liquid Oxygen.
 9,700 gallons of Monomethylhydrazine.
 300  gallons of Nitrogen Tetroxide.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
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5SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENTS
KSC IA was requested to perform survivability assessments to assist in 
program decision making:
 LC-39B Crew Survivability Assessments (2012).
 Evaluated crew survivability during launch countdown at Launch 
Complex 39B for different emergency egress concepts.
 VAB Emergency Egress Survivability Assessment (2013).
 Built upon methodologies used in LC-39B Crew Survivability 
Assessment.
 Evaluated worker survivability during processing of SLS and Orion in 
the VAB.
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Rail System Egress Method
OVERVIEW OF LC 39B ASSESSMENTS
If an emergency situation (fire, imminent explosion, etc.) developed with 
Orion or SLS during launch countdown, 
 LC 39B Emergency Egress System quickly transports four astronauts inside the 
Orion Crew Module to a safe location:
 Apollo era heritage bunker ~ 1,200 feet west of LC 39B, or
 Any location outside the blast danger area radius ~ 6,000 feet.
Several emergency egress systems were under consideration (rail, 
slidewire, elevator, etc.).
 How can each system (defined as Method A1, A2, B1, etc.) be compared other 
than cost?
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METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
Problem:
 Find a way to generate data for the figures of merit (a graphical depiction of 
aggregated quantities used to characterize risk) for evaluating different 
Emergency Egress Concepts for astronauts at the LC-39B using survivability 
versus time to safety.
Methodology:
 Develop Ground Rules and Assumptions
 Define Hazard Scenarios
 Determine Initiating Event Probability
 Determine Error Factor and Uncertainty Distribution
 Develop Survivability Estimate
 Establish Survivability Estimate Uncertainty
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DEVELOP GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Defined Key Terms.  For example:
 Is survival no death, or is survival no death or injuries?
 Death defined as 0% survival.
 What is the timeframe when the event starts and stops?
 Two minutes for astronauts to unbuckle and egress out of the Orion Crew Module.
 Time intervals to reach a safe location were estimated at 0 min, 2 min, 4 min, 6 min, 8 
min, 10 min, 13 min, and 15 min.
Assessment to evaluate astronaut survivability as a function of time.
 Assumed four astronauts moving together using a single egress method.
What is credible or non-credible event?  For example: 
 Likelihood of dying from a single object colliding with Earth is 1.6 x 10-9/year.  
Given that, should the assessment included survivability from an asteroid 
strike? 
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DEFINE HAZARD SCENARIOS
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Method was used to determine which Hazard Scenarios (sequence 
of events commencing with an initiating event that creates an undesirable outcome) would 
require an emergency egress. FTA Method resulted in the simplified Fault Tree below which 
enabled the IA Team to examine all paths from the Initiating Event List to the Top Event to 
establish credible scenarios.
 Top Event:  - is the undesirable event.
 Example:  Conduct an emergency egress.
 Hazard Causes  
 Hazard – A threat, internal or external to a system, that has the potential to cause harm.  The threat is usually a state or set of 
conditions, but in some circumstances, can be an event or activity
 Examples:  Fire, Unbreathable Atmosphere (Toxic or Smoke), Structural Failure (Explosion), or Other traumatic event (health, 
weather, terrorist treat, etc.).
 Initiating Events  
 Initiating Event – Some anomalous occurrence that would eventually lead to a hazard that would require an emergency 
evacuation.
 Examples:  Spacecraft Propellant Leak, Launch Vehicle Electrical Fire Starts, Premature Stage Separation Occurs, 
Ordnance Activation.
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DETERMINE INITIATING EVENT PROBABILITY
Conducted data analysis and reviewed historical documentation.
 Define the likelihood of something failing over time.
 Assigned a probability or likelihood of occurrence for each credible 
Initiating Event developed from the fault tree.
If no numerical data existed, the likelihood of occurrence was 
characterized by expert elicitation.
 Adjective rating such as medium or very low likelihood can be converted 
to a median numerical score.
Median value (50th percentile) is the Initiating Event likelihood of 
occurrence in Failure Space.
 Failure Space describes events or outcomes management does not want 
to occur.
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DETERMINE ERROR FACTOR AND UNCERTAINTY 
DISTRIBUTION
Determine the interval of values or uncertainty distribution 
for the likelihood of occurrence of the Initiating Event.
 Error Factor was used as a measure of dispersion around the 
median.  
 IA Team’s rule of thumb for selecting an Error Factor:
 Error factor 0 - 5 : mature system.
 Error factor 5 – 15: little information available or first application.
 Error Factor > 15: large uncertainties or no information or data.
Error Factor established Upper and Lower bounds for the 
uncertainty distribution.
 Lower Bound = Median Value/Error Factor.
 Upper Bound = Median Value* Error Factor.
Palisade Corporation’s @RISK (pronounced “at risk”) 
Software was used to combine the Upper and Lower Bounds 
with the median value to produce a PERT Distribution.
 Error factors are to be used with the lognormal distribution to 
describe the 5th and 95th percentiles.
 With the PERT distribution, these lower and upper values 
generated by the error factor method provide end points and not 
percentiles. 13
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DEVELOP SURVIVABILITY ESTIMATE
Basis of Estimate for Survival to 
determine the survival score.
 IA Team consensus.
 Interviews.
 Consequence rating from hazard 
reports.
 Evaluation of similar systems and 
historical data.
 Combination of all these methods.
Groundrules
 Assumed the initiating event occurs 
(set the likelihood to 1).
 Determine astronaut survival at each 
time interval assuming they all reached 
a safe haven (a location were they are 
no longer exposed to the hazard).
 The longer the astronauts were 
exposed to a hazard, the lower their 
survival was scored.  
Start
For a given egress method, 
determine likelihood of first 
Initiating Event and 
uncertainty distribution
Given Initiating Event 
occurs, determine 
survival/uncertainty at 
Time = 0
Given Initiating Event 
occurs, determine 
survival/uncertainty at 
next Time interval
Have all 
Initiating 
Events been 
evaluated?
End
Have all time 
intervals 
been 
evaluated?
Yes
Yes
No
No
For the next Initiating 
Event, determine 
likelihood of Initiating 
Event and 
uncertainty 
distribution
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ESTABLISH SURVIVABILITY ESTIMATE 
UNCERTAINTY
 The Median or “Most Likely” value (median) was the 
expected survival assuming the initiating event occurred.
 The Maximum or “Good Day” conditions were the optimal 
conditions  (e.g. the event was not a severe as expected).  
This set the upper bound of the distribution.
 The Minimum or “Bad Day” conditions were where 
everything worked against the personnel surviving the 
hazard.  This set the lower bound of the distribution.
Selection of these values resulted in an interval of 
values used to determine the uncertainty PERT 
distributions in @RISK.
Survival score given the event has occurred was 
defined in Success Space.
 Success Space (e.g., mission success) describes events or 
outcomes management does want to occur.
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CALCULATIONS
PE = likelihood of event occurring.  [input in Failure Space]
PS|E = probability of surviving if event occurs.  [input in Success Space]
Since Failure Space Distribution should not be multiple by a Success 
Space Distribution, we need to develop the PD|E = probability of dying if 
event occurs which is calculated by:
PD|E = 1 - PS|E
PD = probability of dying due to this event which is calculated by:
PD = PE * PD|E = PE * (1 - PS|E)
PS = probability of surviving due to this event which is calculated by:
PS = 1 - PD = (1 - (PE * (1 - PS|E))  [output]
PS all = probability of surviving the occurrence of all Initiating Events 
(assumes events are independent) which is calculated by:
PSall = Π (PSi ) = PS1 * PS2 * ... * PS65 [output]
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CALCULATIONS (CONT.)
Used @RISK (an add-in to Microsoft Excel) and the Latin Hypercube 
sampling method when running probabilistic simulations at 50,000 
iterations to calculate the output for each time interval (shown below as 
the red histogram).
 That is, @RISK used the probability distributions embedded in the risk model 
described in Excel to calculate each 50,000 outcomes.
 Thus, this method simulated 50,000 “what if” Scenarios at one time.
Given the Excel formula is:
1 - (PE * (1 - PS|E)) = PS
 For one time interval and one Initiating Event, then the Excel formula with the 
@RISK add-in software makes:
1 – (                               * (1 - )) =    
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This probabilistic simulation of the Excel formula produces a PERT 
distribution with results at the lower bound, most likely/median, and 
upper bound at a specific time.
 Generated the graphs the Customer requested was accomplish by 
exporting the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of the output histogram for 
each hazard scenarios and the roll-up of all the scenarios at each specific 
time interval in to MS Excel.
The @RISK software could have been used to generate the same 
graph.  However,
 Eliminating the @RISK graphs for each hazard and time interval speeds 
up @RISK processing time.
 Final graphs generated in MS Excel were visually appealing to the 
Customer.
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RESULTS
IA Team created five MS Excel files to illustrate/compare Astronaut 
survival by group or by individual credible hazards identified in the FTA   
These files were:
 All Scenarios, Fire Only Scenarios, Fire and Structural Failure Scenarios, 
Structural Failure Scenario, Unbreathable Atmosphere Scenarios.
The largest MS Excel file (All Scenarios) contained:
 1,786 data entries per method of egress of Input Data.
 2,337 data points generated per method of egress of Output Data.
Below is an example from a single MS Excel file for one time interval, one 
Initiating Event, and one egress method.
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Output (PS) generated from @RISK histogram.
These points are then plotted in MS Excel. Figure of Notional Output Data
Initiating Event (E) Event Likelihood (PE) [Input Data] % Survivability @ 2 Minutes
Event 
No.
Description
Lower 
Bound
50th 
Percentile
(Median)
Upper
Bound
Error 
Factor
Minimum
PS|E
Most Likely
PS|E
Maximum
PS|E
PS at
5.00%
PS at 
50.00%
PS at
95.00%
70 Engine Explosion at Startup Results in Structural Failure 6.00E-04 1.20E-04 2.40E-05 5.0 1.00% 93.00% 100.00% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00%
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RESULTS (CONT.)
As shown in the top right figure of merit, 
a “knee” (i.e. significant decrease in 
survivability) in the top graph can be 
seen at 10 minutes regardless of egress 
method.
 Each astronaut has 10 minutes of 
breathable air in their spacesuits.
 Decrease in crew survivability was 
attributed to no pre-staging of 
supplemental portable breathing air units.
Customer defined mitigation steps will 
be implemented to eliminate the knee.
 Breathing air unit will be pre-stage to allow 
astronauts to exchange units.
 With mitigation steps in place, knee at 10 
minutes disappears in bottom graph.
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RESULTS (CONT.)
Various graphs of the Most Likely values for the seven methods assessed.
 Methods A1, A2, B1, B2, and B3 are roughly the same percentage survivability. 
 Methods A1 and A2 transported Astronauts inside the blast danger zone.
 All other methods transported Astronauts outside the blast danger zone 
(~6000 feet).
 However, cost estimates to build Methods A1, B1, and B3 were ~$40 million more 
than Methods A2, B2, and C1.
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OVERVIEW VAB ASSESSMENT
Evaluation of workers survivability versus time during processing of 
SLS and Orion in the VAB at KSC. 
For the VAB Assessment,
 IA Team was asked to determine if an Initiating Event(s) produce a “knee” on the 
curve indicating that survivability decreased more rapidly than the other event(s).
 Evaluated multiple workers (~14 - 90 people) egressing from multiple locations 
compared to the LC 39B Assessment which assumed four astronauts moving 
together using a single egress method.
 SLS processing occurs in VAB Highbay 3.  There are four highbays in the VAB. Each 
bay measures:
 450 feet high, 209 feet wide, and 228 feet long.
V
A
B
 A
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
24VAB at KSC
OVERVIEW VAB ASSESSMENT (CONT.)
Assembly and testing in VAB occurs over 
several months.
 Created eight different processing phases 
from the start of solid rocket motor erection 
to SLS/Orion roll out to the LC 39B.
 Each processing phase had different 
number of workers in these work locations, 
and duration of each phase also varied.
Multiple workers located in eight 
different zones.
 Each worker could take separate paths to 
reach an exit located ~30 – 180 feet.
Each work zone/phase assessed at eight 
different time intervals to reach an exit.
 Time to reach an exit was estimated at eight 
time intervals of:  0 sec, 10 sec, 20 sec, 30 
sec, 1 min, 2 min, 3 min, and 5 min.
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VAB Zones
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METHODOLOGY
Computation Fluid Dynamic 
Analysis of a Solid Rocket 
Motor Fire in VAB
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Methodology developed for LC 39B assessment  
(hazard scenario development, likelihood, survivability 
estimates, and probability distribution) was used for 
the VAB assessment.
 FTA for VAB assessment produced 78 Initiating Events.
To determine survivability for multiple personnel at 
multiple locations for a specific time, an Aggregate 
Survival Level was calculated as a weighted average 
based on manloading and Survival Level assigned to 
each Zone.
 Aggregate survival level formula for an individual Initiating 
Event during one Phase and at one time interval is: 
P(SAggregate|E) =  𝐢=𝟏
𝟖 𝐇𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐙𝐨𝐧𝐞 𝐢
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐇𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭
∗ 𝐏 𝐒𝐙𝐨𝐧𝐞 𝐢|𝐄
 As outlined in the LC 39B assessment, then Ps for all 
Zones, one Phase, one time interval and Initiating Event is:
PS = 1 - PD = (1 - (PE * (1 - PSAggregate|E))  [output]
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CALCULATIONS
One MS Excel File with eight MS Excel Workbooks
 Each Workbook captured the results from a single phase.
The largest MS Excel file contained:
 Eight workbooks (or tabs).
 Each workbook populated rows and columns with data that was: 
 96 columns wide.
 715 rows deep.
 Processing time was between four to six hours for this large file using a 
dedicated laptop.
 Laptop was comprised of:
 Eight i7 Intel, 64 bit Processors.
 16 GB RAM.
 MS Excel 64 bit software.
 An example of one workbook is shown on the next page.
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CALCULATIONS (CONT.)
• Trace Precedents and Dependents are on for Cells AF14, AG14:AG22, AO22.
• Columns F and K – AE are hidden for clarity.
1 - (PE * (1 - PS|E)) = PS
PE
PSzonei|E
P(SAggregate|E) =  𝐢=𝟏
𝟖 𝐇𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐙𝐨𝐧𝐞 𝐢
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐇𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭
∗ 𝐏 𝐒𝐙𝐨𝐧𝐞 𝐢|𝐄
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A composite scenario was developed, denoted P(SAll), which is the 
probability of surviving all initiating events for a given Phase, each 
time interval, and for all (aggregated) Zones.  
A joint probability that contains 78 probabilities occurring at the 
same time mark.  Thus, the VAB Emergency Egress Analysis formula 
for the probability of surviving all individual 78 Initiating Events at 
the same time is calculated in success space by:
PSall = Π (PSi ) = PS1 * PS2 * ... * PS78 [output]
0 sec 10 sec 20 sec 30 sec 1 min 2 min 3 min 5 min
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RESULTS (CONT.)
Pareto Analysis of all the hazard scenarios and all phases revealed 
slope of the survivability curve is dominated by five Instant 
Scenarios.  
 These instant scenarios were five flight hardware stacking mishaps, arc 
flash, SRB fire, and propellant tank rupture.
 Instant Scenarios were defined as: Survivability rapidly decreases within the first 
few seconds and remains constant thereafter.  
 Degrading scenarios survivability estimates were within industry norms.
 Degrading Scenarios were defined as:  Survivability gradually decreases with 
time required to reach an Exit.
The figures of merit for the VAB assessment provided the decision 
makers with quantified risk to ground personnel during emergency 
egress in various operational concepts.
 Egress strategies (build enclosed egress paths, more egress paths, etc.) 
do not mitigate Instant Scenarios.
 $6 - $8 million cost avoidance. 32
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SUMMARY
Graphs developed from these assessments are a decision-
informing tool for Project Managers which roll up multiple factors:
 The whole population of the LC 39B or VAB.
 A specific time period.
 A spectrum of potential events.
 Weighted by the likelihood of occurrence of the event.
Both assessments were conducted early in the design process and 
resulted in cost savings, including $40 million cost savings in LC 
39B emergency egress design.
The information in this presentation is published in NASA Technical 
Paper “Probabilistic Survivability versus Time Modeling”, 
NASA/TP—2015–218876 located at url address:  
 http://ntrs.nasa.gov or
 http://hdl.handle.net/2060/20150021266.
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